Adding to Latin American Discourse
- Nikola Ranick
- Feb 4, 2024
- 10 min read
Mindful of recent positive developments in Guatemala, as well as the exact opposite in Ecuador, it seemed a prudent time as ever to throw out my thoughts on Latin American Society in general. This piece, supplied as a final submission for my Political Participation and Representation Class, was (like all my work at LSE) not that great because it was not that inspired. However, the debate of presidentialism vs. parliamentarianism has a long lineage, particularly in Latin America. And in an era of increasing authoritarianism globally, the role of a dominant governmental figure is surely something worth dissecting.
Thus I present my new - and ever slightly improved- take on the process
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Practical Progress: Defending Latin America’s Imperfect Yet Improving Presidentialism
Arguing over the best democratic institution seems the wrong debate when illiberal politics infects every system. Still, niche regions beget equally niche outcomes. In terms of Latin America, its original institutional developments were as tumultuous as its colonial founding, eventually settling on presidential majoritarianism akin to its northern neighbor (the eerily parallel presidential campaigns and political afterlives of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro are case-in-point). But what of overall democratic success? Trashing everything Latin America is an easy academic reprise for internal and external analysts. Indeed, it was this very assumption which fueled this writer’s desire to look into the ‘how’ and ‘why.’ And yet, contrary to expectations of democratic backsliding, I found these very institutions demonstrating a simultaneous enduring versatility toward both previous difficulties and present-day challenges. The system is in distress, no doubt, but as distress and democracy intertwine themselves in every pocket of the world, more credit is due for a region that has largely evaded its worst possible outcomes time and time again.
Accordingly, this paper seeks to assess and defend Latin America’s usage of the Presidential System by firstly charting their institutional development in context with scholarly debates on representative government. It will then demonstrate the adaptability of these systems in recent democratic history, citing specific examples of institutional endurance and political maturation as proof of success. The piece ends in suggesting several international factors exogenous to Presidentalism which may bear responsibility for institutional failures.
1: Historical Institutions and Their Theoretical Underpinnings
As opposed to raw political assumptions of copy-and-paste presidentialism, institutional research demonstrates the complex thoughts, influences, and experimentation inherent to Latin America’s Democratic Development. True, it is not wholly unfair to assume that: 1) Because the region largely adopted Presidentialism based on its emancipated-inspiration to the north, 2) It therefore also falls victim - and more severely- to hyper majoritarianism, gridlock, and authoritarian tendencies. Yet this rash statement buries historical nuances which prove the first and secondary points as a largely incomplete narrative.
To deconstruct this assumption, we must outline the debate between presidentialism and its oft-reported superior sibling of parliamentarism. This comparison is most deftly explained in the infamous work by Juan Linz that seeks to pick a superior system. As if the name ‘Perils of Presidentialism’ is not enough of a giveaway, Linz’ breakdown casts heavy doubt on the feasibility of a presidential system to maintain or develop democratic institutions in comparison to the more deliberative parliamentarism alternative (Linz, 69). In the context of our discussion, Linz wrote his piece in 1989 in reference to the tumult with which Latin American Democratic Systems proved ineffective and non-lasting. After all, most were just emerging from military juntas who had overthrown previous presidential systems.
This eventual re-democratization of the region has not disproved Linz’ larger points, with his arguments cited and expanded to the present day. Professors Llanos and Nolte’s back Linz in critiquing the presidential model for its excesses, suggesting Latin America as the most apt case-in-point to the system’s failings, especially in relation to the so-called dual legitimacy fallacy - between the executive and legislature - and fixed term failures - the inability to call elections in periods of political gridlock or disapproval. (Llanos and Nolte, 2-5). In regards to this paper, these writings demonstrate continual awareness of presidential concerns from before the most recent round of democratization and to present day. They represent but an inkling of the overwhelming narrative that presidentialism is an inferior form of government to its alternatives and that Latin America provides the best example of this precise failure. Of course, both scholarly debate and institutional development did not in a mutually exclusive manner but were consistently in discussion with each other as they both progressed. I encourage a deeper historical analysis towards the very construction of these institutions as opposed to labeling them clear presidential pariahs.
Starting in the early Independence Years of the 1800’s, this period’s institutional consensus settled on a presidential framework, barring temporary Proportional Representation experiments in Brazil and substantial periods of autocracy witnessed in early state development. It is true that the US played an outsized role, both as an inspiration for Latin American independence and as modeling for its constitutional prototype a la Federalism, Judicial Review, etc. (Cheibub et al, 1709-1710). Yet, for the region’s constitutionalists, the US was merely a starting point in discussion with the specific circumstances for Latin America, ultimately resulting in a regionally-specific presidentialism (Cheibub et al, 1709). These takeaways illustrate an eclectic approach to institution building beyond generic presidentialism, and which may actually have wired in specific components of parliamentarism (which Llanos and Nolte admit was itself largely in infancy). Indeed, the role of French, Portuguese, Norwegian, and Spanish constitutions (aspiring to be largely parliamentarian in design) are cited as additionally strong influences for the region’s framers (Cheibub et al, 1720). The merits, then, of referral to Latin American systems as plainly presidential, are themselves questionable, as a hybrid approach was the preferred outcome
Additional research also reveals a parroting of Europe when it came to electoral and judicial systems, as well as the overall centralization of the state (Valenzuela, 5). True, those very institutions could be considered presidential-adjacent, but I argue the very interplaying of them distinctly altered the presidential paradigm. Ultimately, all options were on-the-table throughout early and later institutional development, making Latin American Democratic Institutions its own distinct breed.
2) Recent Evidence of Systematic Adaption and Endurance
Consistent to a history of institutional innovation, recent developments within Latin American presidentialism serve to enable better outcomes of imperfect institutions. True enough, the stain of the military juntas is a lingering source of insecurity for the region’s democrats and an example-in-waiting for its critics. But the period of democratization afterwards can and should be viewed as a key break for the better in Latin America’s Institutional History. An enhanced presidential system is certainly the conclusion reached by Cheibub and co: …executive lawmaking, in this view, facilitates accountability, ” resting such conclusions on a notably more successful style than contemporary Africa and an assumption that tyranny itself is historical but not presently relevant (Cheibub et al, 1729). Although some of these takeaways appear through rose-colored glasses, the underlying theme of progress in institutional integrity, or, ‘Resilience through Adaptation’ (Llanos and Nolte, 8), is largely undeniable. Cynical analysts tend to highlight these in passing, but I believe they deserve more central billing. On many fronts, Latin America has learned its lessons, even if additional improvements are still glaringly present.
In finding specific examples, this paper cites improvements to concerns and quandaries initially listed by Scott Mainwairing. The author emphasizes a more nuanced analysis of Latin America, namely comparing Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay to the United States as opposed to its Latin Neighbors (Mainwaring, 160). It would pivot the analysis from North and South to authoritarian vs. democratic presidencies, a distinction which said nations (alongside the likes of Panama) deserve in recognition of their political maturity. This cohort is advanced in development, anti-corruption, bureaucracy, and state feasibility, providing examples of clear success within the presidential model. Even as both Uruguay and Panama suffer high level corruption scandals of late, the states have not shattered but continue to endure and adapt. And for as much negative press as Chile accrues, the very push for accountability, constitutional revision, its subsequent failure, and push anew (Americas Quarterly), are suggestive of an incredibly mature democratic model within the configures of presidentialism. According to Mainwaring’s initial observations, versatility in design and adaptation in these countries showed Latin American governance at its absolute best. This comment is true most vividly for the states listed above, through to the present day and, unlike some other states, shows no serious signs of abatement.
Of course, the easiest academic retort lies in the tiny population of these nations (barring Chile). Yet I would point to the most functional parliamentary states in Europe, in the Baltics and Nordic Lands, as themselves miniscule in nature, making this ideological comeback null. And I would also not so quickly dismiss its larger counterparts for the progress they have made.
When it came to overall Latin American challenges, Mainwaring identified five points of concern: 1) Rigidness of terms, 2) Personalism of politics, 3) Autonomy of Presidents from Parties, 4) Lacking mechanism for majority legislative system, 5) and limitations of presidential power despite high expectations. (Mainwaring, 166). In terms of this analysis, Points 1, 2, and 4 are most potent to this paper. In present day Latin America, many institutional adaptations and norms of political maturity have, if not neutralized, at least lessened the impact factor that Mainwairing forewarned.
For Points 1 and 4, Llanos and Nolte provide the best theoretical case for improvement: Multi-Party coalitions can be built in presidential regimes known as Coalition Presidentialism, and premature changes in presidency can serve as a de-facto vote of no-confidence to improve overall democratic accountability (Llanos and Nolte, 4-6). This maturation of democracy means consensus between parties is a must to hammer out policy on both the legislative and executive levels, something lengthy coalition-building in parliamentarism also necessitates. Actual examples of this include the notorious Brazilian El Centrão, the recent partnership between Mexico’s PRI and PRD, and most holistically, recent Green Wave Feminist Activism across the region leading to the likes of legalized abortion in Argentina and Colombia. These agreements, like all democratic values, are imperfect, but that very political maturation should not be discounted.
Later actions of El Centrão are often handicapped as particularly noteworthy, if not seemingly counterproductive, namely the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016. Though hindsight and Western opinions view this largely negatively, the Brazilian Public and Rousseff’s single digit approval rating beg to differ and, therefore, could arguably still negate Mainwaring’s concerns. See such cases in Peru, Paraguay and, soon, perhaps, Ecuador as additional evidence (the same standards should not be applied to the army coup in Bolivia, however the return to democracy is nonetheless indicative of systemic maturity). All witnessed a reduction in term rigidity which creates plenty of space for de-facto no-confidence. That is an informal adoption of perhaps one of parliamentariasm’s best features.
It is asinine to praise the new flexibility of terms without its negatives of turnover and special interests, and yet still, this very practice also challenges Mainwairing’s Point 2 Dangers. Indeed, with turnover frequent and power transferred peacefully, the excesses of presidential populism, though apparent, have avoided their worst outcomes. See the loss of influence amongst the Fujimoris in Peru, Correa in Ecuador, Uribe in Colombia, Kirchner in Argentina, Hernandez in Honduras, and even somewhat of Morales in Bolivia (Americas Quarterly). Though involving presidential-adjacent systems, note systemic maturity as key in stopping institutional upheaval and wider ovations towards populist authoritarianism. It certainly should assuage Linz and Llanos and Nolte’s aforementioned concerns from Section One. These processes occur through messy means, but we cannot ignore the survival of these institutions in adapting for the better.
Speaking of the right direction, the very transfer of powers to previously governed ideology is perhaps the most cut-and-dry success of modern Latin American Presidentialism. While Venezuela’s tragic autocracy takes up the most oxygen, look at the refusal of Brazil’s tattered institutions to crumble both during Bolsonaro’s presidency and on his way out of it. See also the peaceful and democratic elections of Colombia and Mexico’s first modern leftist leaders, with a special attention placed on the endurance of Mexican Institutions for persevering despite assaults by said new leadership. Even in the notoriously tumultuous Northern Triangle the defeat and charging of a corrupt drug-lord in Honduras and elevation of Xiomara Castro to the presidency shows a stunning turn of events for a once-increasingly autocratic country (Americas Quarterly). Nearly every situation outlined above bears nuance but credit is due where it is deserved. These are developments which will hopefully not unravel in the face of outside interference, as they have in the past.
3) Exogenous Factors Affecting Democratic Development
Imperative to any assessment of Latin American Presidentialism involves acknowledging the uniquely difficult circumstances with which Latin American Societies have functioned within, or rather the international environment that has made it particularly pernicious. These institutions have always had to function around uniquely inhospitable exogenous factors, whether it be a colonial legacy of over 300 years of occupation or a neighborhood of influence within the burgeoning Cold War. Indeed, recognizing presidentialism in Latin America means acknowledging the history which distinguishes it from any other region in the world, regardless of presidentialism or parliamentarism.
The lasting legacy of colonial exploitation is a research with endless scope, but for this paper’s relevance and length, look no further than the work of Steve Stern, who outlines the exogenous nature of colonial systems in uniquely poisoning democratic institutions in the region. This so-called “...deeply entrenched historical significance…” (Stern, 372) encompasses an economic system uniquely enduring exploitative labor, state-building model inherent to self-colonization, and a stringent class system inherited largely from colonial racial-caste establishments” (Stern, 381-385). As these components were developed previously to the democratic institutions of the state, they clearly linger thereafter to their infringement. Faulting institutional failure on Latin American Institutions or presidentialism writ-large means ignoring the underlying social, economic, and cultural foundations from the colonial era that were built specifically to prevent democracy. Modern analysis is not naive to the endurance of exploitative systems long after their abolition (South Africa is the loudest contemporary example), and yet, much scholarship criticizing Latin American Presidentialism fails to coherently control for it.
As for the modern shocks responsible for military juntas, look no further than the Cold War legacy as further proof of stymied democratic systems. Hal Brands’s look into the conflict’s effect notes the region as a ‘Third World Outlier,’ for, despite its long track record of development and independence relative to others in the Global South, the Soviet-ization of Cuba and accompanying US pushback propelled the regions to the frontlines of international influence-jockeying (Brands, 1- 3). US and Soviet Influence in Nicaragua, Cuba, Chile, Peru, Guatemala only brushes the surface of the extent of exogeneity. This bruising ideological war front disintegrated an otherwise independent system development. Tragically, scholarship scapegoats the presidential model’s role in its collapse as opposed to the exogenous power players that looked to destroy any system out of its ideological favor. This foreign interference disabled an otherwise blossoming region from bettering its own institutions. To hold democratic institutions solely liable is to apply a higher standard of scrutiny than any other region, and ignore the historical realities of the Cold War. It also bears additional forewarning and preparation as the rivalry between the US and China further envelops the region as well.
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By charting the theoretical and institutional history of the region’s democratic systems, recognizing recent positive developments, and controlling for external shocks, the enduring functionality of Latin America Presidentialism shines through even when most academic narratives suggest quite the opposite. Of course, there is no full-on parliamentary system within Latin America to compare. However, an embarrassingly underutilized retort lies in the collapse of long functioning democracies (presidential and parliamentary) in the vast majority of the world within the last 100 years from international conflict or more localized vectors. After all, Latin America’s Iberian forefathers maintain democratic regimes barely older than the former, and few would find the most puritan parliamentary proportional system, Israel, to be without notable, if not significant, blemish. The ugly truth is that democratic systems are - to this day and forward - incredibly fragile and will continue to be due to the social contracts and heterogeneous interests inherent to them. The history of the world is enveloped in failure and frustration; to deem Latin America as especially repugnant for theirs is hypocritical and patronizing.
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