Debating Balkan Disunity on Serbian Xmas

What better way to ring in the Gregorian Calendar's Proclamation of Messianic Birth than a steep political debate that is the furthest thing from Holy??

Alas, as anyone familiar with the region knows, politics and religion intersect perhaps a bit too jovially in the former Yugoslavia, and are one of the many-MANY reasons for its breakup.

Skopje, North Macedonia. Steps as trodden as territorial disputes in the region.

The following article was an essay for my Central and Eastern Europe module analyzing the different scopes of agency for the region's breakup. Naturally, this essay could never tackle its full scope, but I would like to emphasize the crucial downplaying of ancient hatreds by academia that I, myself being Balkan, found rather curious. Perhaps in addition to the difficulty of measuring such, such cultural divides make for rather politically incorrect narratives towards humanity's ability to cohabitate. Still, ask any Serb (ex-pat or domestic) what they think of an independent Kosovo, and you may find yourself relishing a conversational switch to the seemingly simple Israeli-Palestinian divide.

Of course, nuance is inevitable to the human experience, and the many peoples within the Balkans maintain a long record of comradery (or at the very least, co-commiseration towards larger invading powers) alongside conflict. So any analysis must take in many components to paint a full picture.

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Looking for a grand answer to the break-up of Yugoslavia is about as complicated as the nation’s dissolution itself! Yet in the age of political populism, the role of the individual faces ever more attention as an agency force. Indeed, the power of names like Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudman, and Milan Kucan suggest nationalist leaders - or those ultimately embracing nationalism - as central. But like the many ethnicities of the former Yugoslavia, these leaders are but one piece in an intricate menagerie of competing claims. This paper suggests the breakup of Yugoslavia was not due to just nationalist politicians, but the way in which said individuals further exacerbated the crumbling institutional factors of a weak constitution, flailing economy, infant democracy, and republic-level nationalism of the population.

At What Was: Regional Governing Enclaves in the Former Yugo

The slow burn failure of Yugoslavia’s new constitution enabled nationalist leaders to expand their authority in opposition to a perennially gridlocked system. This last attempt was itself a long term buildup of failures in rectifying ethnic conflict within a fluctuating federalized system. It featured a rotating presidency, a regional allotted veto to nations and specific territories, and confusing rules of proportional representation; all of which largely functioned due to the enduring role of Tito. After his death, the system seemed to offer nothing but stalemate to ethnically heterogeneous interests vetoing their opposing interests (Djilas, 1993). Although this crisis cascaded long before the rise of specific nationalist leaders, the dysfunction nonetheless proved an ideal political climate for them. They faced no coherent federal opposition, which, in turn, validated the popularity of their propositions and undermined the pan Yugoslavism that only 5% of the population identified with anyway (Dimitrov, 2023). Disfunction begets division which nationalists leveraged. Indeed, Milosevic’s call for a Greater Serbia outside of the constitutional framework could have faced more functional opposition (and therefore less Serbian support) if the constitutional model functioned enough to offer an alternative outcome. This federally insufficient model created an Articles of Confederation-style policy conducive to federal dismemberment. 

Republic-level policymaking alongside the end of the Cold War invoked ethnic nationalism of the general population which convinced or converted leaders alike could further manipulate. After all, Milosevic and Tudic themselves evolved into nationalists arguably because they saw the political suasions of their people moving precisely there (Jovic, 2001). It is proof that their agency arose not from themselves but in dialogue with structural failings and attitudinal responses. This public-level nationalism also surged since external threats expired with the Cold War. Remember the invention of a pan-Slavic state was partially based on presenting a unified defense against larger, historically aggressive powers with a history of subjugation (Jovic, 2001). With the destruction of the Iron Curtain, active border threats were seemingly removed for the first time in nearly 700 years. Accordingly, internal development was further prioritized, and questions of ethnic nation-states re-emerged, difficult for a region of eight nations, five languages, and three religions. Identities that once worked synonymously reasserted themselves in opposition as opposed to unity: Hapsborgian and Catholic Slovenia and Croatia alongside Eastern-influenced Muslim and Orthodox heritage of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and those in between (Jovic, 2001). For leaders then, adopting nationalism was an act of political posturing to the masses which newly rediscovered and internalized it.

Tito's Grave: your writer quite literally stumbled onto it at the Yugoslavian Museum

As if popular sentiment were not animating enough, the transition to democracy and republic-level elections provided nationalist leaders an opportunity to leverage raw ethnic support. Recall the last attempt at democracy decades before had collapsed due to the presence and subsequent assassination of Croatian Nationalist Leaders in 1928, one of so many instances embodying regionally dominant Croatia and Serbia sparring over their different visions. The continuation of boundaries that did not correspond to ethnic homogeneity (a large Serbian minority population in Croatia, Albanians in Macedonia and Serbia, and so on) further instituted a question of minority rights and infringement concerns throughout much of the region. Indeed, Republic-level elections seemed almost destined for a secessionist result, which certainly occurred in Slovenia via Kucan, Croatia via Tudjman, and their respective nationalist parties. Even the communist victory in Serbia and Montenegro was de facto a nationalist placeholder, with only Bosnia and Macedonia managing inter-ethnic (and quite fragile) coalitions (Cohen, 1995). The elections themselves then became an opportunity for nationalist leaders to both better connect with nationalizing populations and claim legitimacy towards achieving their outcomes, no matter how counter-Yugoslavian. After all, it was hard to remain pan-Slavic if elections would only distinguish each ethnicity from each other.

Governing systems had altered significantly throughout the nation's history, but the added stressor of the economic crisis was the cherry on top for nationalist influence. The success of early era Yugoslavia in prioritizing distribution and juggling Western and Eastern influence should certainly be commended. However the country’s gridlock in terms of balancing ethnic interests also mirrored the failure to balance marketing reforms with continual socialist ideals and perhaps more importantly, balancing the development of the Western half relative to the underdevelopment of the eastern half (Jovic, 2001). Accordingly, an economic crisis occurred that was so severe that the country faced a humiliating IMF bailout. Conditions were made all the worse by the liberalizing and eventual collapse of the USSR as an economic partner and, therefore, the Cold War as an arena of influence peddling and financial incentive allotment accordingly (Cohen, 1995). Declining economic well being is often the greatest kindling for nationalist fervor, as ‘us vs. them’ mentalities and region-specific subsidies burst into the spotlight. It made nationalist calls such as Milosevic’s modest economic reform all the more enticing because it at least offered something. Nationalists had much to offer for those who had nothing to lose and much to blame.

How's It Going? An Abandoned Orthodox Church in Pristina, Kosovo.

Although nationalist leaders were an unequivocal source of further dissolution, they only attained such status by taking advantage of the structural failings of Yugoslavia constitutionally, economically, socially, and democratically. Many can chalk up the roots to this to stereotypes of ancient hatred. But that ancient hatred only bears legitimacy when placed in the foil of economic decline and systematic breakdown. In this respect then, nationalist leaders may be the straw that breaks the camel's back in harmonizing all features of dissatisfaction; but they couldn’t be without the dysfunction occurring under them in the first place.