We Are One, Divided: Examining Hindu Nationalism within Indian Political Culture (Collegiate Upload)

Today I am showcasing an old assignment from college which I think has more and more validity as time passes in India. I cover the evolution of political Hinduism to modern day. Mildly outdated but I am still very proud of what I wrote.

Introduction

No matter how broad, every field of study has that one outlier inconsistent with all other data. In global studies, that’s India. This developing nation is quite poor yet vibrantly democratic, the only Hindu majority nation in the world, and despite diverse creeds, cultures and beliefs, has managed thus far to stay together as one nation. Yet look closer and the central question of ‘What is India’ continually evolves (if not erupts), especially within its Hindu framework. Verily, the example India puts forward in grappling with its own sectarianism and crafting ‘unity within diversity’ will likely foreshadow the fate of a globalized world with more heterogeneous nations. This paper analyzes the political history of Hindu Nationalism within the sub-continent now known as India. It will firstly examine mid-colonial history, noting the lack of unifying identity other than British Imperialism and practices of Hinduism which, accompanied by strongly communalistic organizations, conjured an artificial national identity to incentivize the subcontinent’s independence. It will then examine newly independent India’s foundational beliefs in secularism as unable to stop rising and multifaceted Hindu Nationalism channeled by the BJP, evinced in rhetoric and several public atrocities. Finally, this paper will enunciate Hindutva’s present vitality through the Coalition Era and into the BJP’s Majority Government, as it demonstrates solid party foundations and likely political monopoly going forward.

Early Identity in a Divided Subcontinent Traditional history of the subcontinent involves significantly diverse groups of people unifying over little beyond British Colonialism, except for modest cultural semblance maintained through Hinduism. Even as more radical groups embracing communalism and Hindutva emerged, this constructed commonality fueled the nation’s push for independence.

As the region presently referred to as India was historically home to diverse societies and creeds, the closest sense of joint identity was in religious and social factors. Indeed, for pre-colonial India, a lack semblance was the norm. While some historians (and certainly many in the nationalist camp) believe in a culturally advanced and unified utopian India of yesteryear, most others deny such origin stories. Ariel Bardi sees India historically and currently as a ‘Patchwork of Layered Sovereignty:’ 565 states with varying languages and cultures (Bardi, 1). Such facts suggest a region too diverse to be defined by one identity, except perhaps by those who lay outside of it. Arun Swamy writes that although ancient foreigners (such as the Chinese Han) referred to the region’s collective people as the Indu, intra-Indian identity was as divided by geographic allegiances and cultural expression as those making up infamously sectarian Italy (Swamy, 1). Indeed, the actual territory has a variety of interceding ethnic and cultural identities which still make claims of India as a one coherent nation-state ambiguous at best. Yet despite these differences, the common religion (if one deems it narrowly as such) of Hinduism was the strongest commonality within all of these groups. Although interpretations of being Hindu itself also varied, Irfan Habib notes all the territories agreed on: “...universal presence of the inequities of caste system, or the prevalence of Sanskrit as the language of the learned…” (Habib, 5). These words evoke Hinduism as a marginal similarity maintained across differing identities, with social structures and sacred language similar in regions where everything else was different. In this mold does Kim Knott identify Hinduism in a broader context, namely as an ethnic-religion influential in traditionally ‘secular’ concepts of economic, social and political structures (Knott, 88). Like Habib, Knott suggests Hinduism is less a plenary religious institution and more an ideological foundation most groups within the subcontinent follow to a similar-enough degree. Although comparable to general beliefs of Christianity in Europe, the big difference between Hinduism in India and Christianity in the (mostly) independent nations of Europe was that the former would face a mutual domination through colonialism of the latter. Even in a loosely tethered ideological region, shared colonialism would cultivate joint Indian experience. Although the sub-continent faced European domination for centuries, it was a commonality that came most home via English Imperialism: “It is only with the British conquest that the notion of common suffering and common resistance within India as a whole grew” (Habib, 5). This viewpoint suggests that despite substantial intra-Indian differences, what the whole subcontinent did agree on was the desire to reject Western rule and pursue self-governance. Interestingly, Indian middle classes primarily powered this drive, as the common education administered by colonists would become catalytic for further unity and provide teachings of revolutionary nation-state ideals consistent with the French Revolution (Habib, 3). These experiences only further embody mutualism emerging in a region with little else in common. Yet these groups still needed some a of identification beyond being oppressed; thus, did the loose construct of Hinduism proxy for unity in achieving political freedom.

In creating a common cause for freedom, Hinduism was the most ideal consolidation factor even if it wasn’t perfectly synonymous across every culture. Brian Hatcher writes colonialism specifically changed the discourse of Hinduism, channeling the widespread urge for political unity into an actuality combatting the common experiences of exploitation, tribute, and deindustrialization (Hatcher, 249). Clearly, Hatcher’s words are indicative of Hinduism’s political evolution in both embodying resistance and creating pseudo-unity. Still, Thomas Howard replicates Benedict Anderson’s theory in that the idea of a naturally unified Hindu People is an: “‘imagined community,’ an ideological construct used to project a unifying identity where traditional forms are diverse and insufficiently pliable to political purposes” (Howard, 2). These words suggest a false grouping was necessary to create the closest thing possible to mutual experience and therefore the political right of self-governance. If this surface-level commonality was convincible, there could then be no force preventing the subcontinent from freeing itself. Yet alongside this push for common independence emerged more radical forms of identification, most embodied by the formation of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its channeling of Hindutva and Communalism. Translating exactly to ‘National Volunteer Organization,’ the RSS was founded by K. B. Hedgewar as an apparatus to promote and represent Hindu culture. It expanded notably in the independence pushes of the ‘30s and ‘40s, growing out of the same middle-class base that pushed for broader political freedoms. Furthermore, it was stylistically-militant in approach and appearance, often initiating calls to restore greater India to its mythic (and questionably existent) golden age. Operating via organizational subsections of youth, religion, women, and students, the RSS’ overarching beliefs are best understood within the terms of Communalism and Hindutva. In contrast to just purely nation-based nationalism, historian John Zavos defines communalism as an extreme ethno-domination identity maintained via a mutual and radical antagonism of the other (Zavos, 2269). This description maintains a dangerous undertone, for identity is based not so much on actual commonality but on similar enemies; perhaps a sectarian rethinking of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend.’ Alas, the us vs. them mentality has historically been insatiable in creating a community of divergent yet self-identifying people. Of Hindutva, otherwise known as radical Hindu Nationalism, Hatcher writes: “…claims about Hindutva are effectively also claims about India as a Hindu nation, a nation that excludes all those who are non-Hindus, not least Muslims and Christians” (Hatcher, 245). These words verify Hindutva, even despite the intra-ethnic difference within Hindu Nationalism, as a unifier through supposed superiority and exclusion. After all, many of the region’s varying cultures had traditionally distrusted perceived outsiders, whether they be Muslims, Sikhs or otherwise. Even though the ‘other’ resided geographically near for centuries, Hindutva was certainly the subcontinent’s style of communalism.

Despite divisive rhetoric within these movements, such radicalism further inspired patriotism and ideas establishing an unofficial subcontinent culture. After all, recall that a more rousing ethnic identity was needed to unify the people to political action, even if such was radical or personified groupism. Verily, as these appeals to commonality were influential in justifying overthrow of the British Raj, the nefarious background to Hindutva remained. Although the RSS itself was technically ‘apolitical,’ it did contain a political wing known as Jana Sangh (later, the BJS, and now, the BJP). Thoroughly communalistic, this party developed a staunchly pro-Hindu and strikingly anti-Muslim reputation. Among other policies, it encouraged Hindi as the national language, a ban on slaughtering cows, and early recognition of the state of Israel; all policies creating intentional hostility to the country’s once strong Muslim community and other minority groups (Flood, 263). This platform embodies the communalism of Hindu Extremists that nonetheless served as a means to unity. It was a simultaneous radicalism and means of bridgebuilding for independence; a push for freedom yet oppressor-in-waiting. And this was not an ideology that could simply be swept under the rug. After all, nationalism does not just melt away once the so-called nation has been achieved.

Independent India’s Struggle to Define Itself Externally of Hindutva

Secular structuralism within post-colonial India could not stop, and perhaps even aided, Hindu Nationalism, with such political influence best channeled by the impressively flexible BJP. Hindutva radicals increasingly multiplied and radicalized, with the 1992 Mosque Burning, 2002 Pogroms, and other acts testament to such.

Even with severe Hindu nationalism providing foundational support for independence, the newly free nation under the Indian National Congress (INC) embraced stringent secular beliefs. Indeed, it still is rather ironic that nation-building rhetoric was not best channeled by Hindutva advocates as much as the INC, with their leaders serving as the Freedom Fighters of India. These moderates enjoyed a honeymoon phase of national unity as public support for rampant nationalism waned in response to more than half a million killed in partition and the Hindu Extremist assassination of spiritual scion Mahatma Gandhi. With such atrocities witnessed, the INC settled on preventing any other anarchical mini-partition. Although the party’s genuine commitment to secularism was questionable at best, they nonetheless appeared to full heartedly embrace it in constructing a new Constitution. New laws calmed sectarian passions and structured political institutions in such a coalitionary way that painful questions of exactly who or what was being represented were avoided at all costs (by banning, for example, specifically religiously-motivated political parties) (Zavos, 2274-2275). The most primordial symbol of this turn was the RSS being outlawed for its role in goading such unhealthy communalistic instincts, particularly as one of its former members was Gandhi’s assassin

(Howard, 3). Although these acts were certainly progressive and the nation itself seemed euphoric in its newfound self-governance, the very way in which these issues were addressed spoke further to the conundrum (nay, inevitable conflict) of maintaining the diverse unity that enabled independence in the first place. As a distinct concept of Indianism failed to emerge, Hindu nationalism once again appeared on the rise. Much of the failure for a genuine commonality to develop beyond mutual oppression may have to do with the very egalitarian foundations instituted. Indeed, Indian understanding of secularism is significantly different from the West, with an emphasis on equal treatment of religions as opposed to just a separation of such (Hatcher, 251-252). In this way, the state did not distance itself from all faiths but rather regarded them in equal authority. Such divisions were only further emphasized via the strongly decentralized state system that would come to dominate Indian politics. As opposed to a nation establishing itself separate from sectarian notions, India’s begetting of such may have led to religious and other social groups maintaining exclusively separate communities (blocking any possibility of nation-identity development). With citizens still identifying foremost with heterogenous communities and the honeymoon of independence fading, there really was not much else holding the new country together; certainly not any semblance of Indian identity. Verily, the slow re-embrace of Hindu nationalism as a commonality for most Indians seemed almost inevitable, for: “As leadership became concentrated in New Delhi after Partition, national unity in turn began to revolve around a majority-Hindu, Hindi-speaking authority that remains in the dominant cultural and political force over seven decades later” (Bardi, 2). With Hindutva the only possible similarity within a nation of diversity, its controversial social and political re-entry manifested itself in pseudo-intellectualism and philosophy over religiosity. Indeed, the flaming nationalism of pan-Hinduism, that which gathered these hundreds of diverse communities into one nation, could not simply be put out; at least not if the new nation wanted to stay together. After all, coming decades of infighting in Africa and Asia proved civil war within commonly colonized territory was not unheard of it; for many, the breakup of once-synonymous regions was the norm. For India, unification would once again have to find itself not through self-identification but in opposition of the other, now wholly focused on Christians, Muslims and other minorities. As the necessity for anything to spark mutualism emerged, Hindutva would also evolve in a similar manner. This sophisticated (though wholly radical) ideology appealed to and inspired cross-subcontinent commonalities, like ancient grievances at the hands of foreigners, a deep sense of historical injustice, and fears of demographic decline (Howard, 4). These sentiments proved general enough to appeal to many Hindu-practicing groups with marginally similar societal values, yet specific enough to bind the people together in an ode to common experience (even if that experience was in both oppression and combatting a supposed enemy). This ideological undertaking could no better coincide than with the 1951 launch of the BJS, the revived political wing of the RSS, who had finally regained legality. The party enunciated their view of Hindutva as nationalism over religiosity, with Hindutva as a supposed ‘way of life’ rather than a specific religious path (for recall specific religiously-affiliated parties were banned). Although this notion was certainly dubious, the rhetorical strategy was nonetheless upheld by Indian institutions via the Supreme Court’s ruling on its legality (Hatcher, 251). In seeing the Jana Sangh as nationalistic and not religiously based, secular India was allowing a dangerous political entity to enter the fray, perhaps because there was no semblance of genuine unity otherwise.

As it rejoined politics, the BJS originally trumpeted its nationalist rhetoric uniquely. At the start, T.V. Sathyamurthy’s says Hindu Nationalism ideals were solely promoted in the political arena by the BJS. And despite the dominant governments of the secular INC, the BJS continually expanded in support, especially as its style of politics embraced a populist twist in the ‘60s/70s. Indeed, while other parties emphasized equanimity of religion, the BJS kept its undertones and grew its base, enough so to serve briefly in government in 1977. In response, these other parties, even the Congress, began to politically pivot somewhat by embracing sectarian concerns as well (Sathyamurthy, 3002). This gradual ideological realignment proved the success the now-BJP had in appealing to Hindu Fundamentalism as a political theme, enough so for other parties to jump on the nationalistic bandwagon for their own political survival. Even with Hindutva ideology central to its organization, the BJP maintained their consistent rise by the flexibility inherent to a nationalism that must appeal to diverse groups of people: “Rhetorically and tactically Hindu nationalism has long alternated between pragmatic coalition-building and religious polarization. Its consistent threads are cultural homogenization and antipathy towards Muslims…militant ethno-nationalism” (Swamy, 1). This prose presents the irony of militant nationalism building diverse coalitions among caste and community. In a nation as diverse as India, this type of heterogenous nationalism worked because it did not include everyone! The raucous organization continually maintained its motley organization through rejecting others, most often the Muslims (whose numbers post-Partition collapsed from 50% to a measly 15% by the 21st century). Indeed, this nationalistic diversity was still one based on limiting other forms of difference and dissent.

Despite a supposed inclusive structure, the dangers of communal nationalism became increasingly public, with the most dramatic acts of violence since partition occurring in 1992 via the Demolition of the Babri Masjid Mosque. That year, massive local outcry emerged in Uttar Pradesh (India’s most popular state) when a local judge reopened a 16th century mosque. This was speculated by many nationalists to have been built over a Hindu temple marking the birthplace of Rama, a popular Hindu mythological King. In reaction to this supposed blasphemy, 100,000 Hindus (labelling themselves as ‘volunteers’) literally destroyed the mosque in an expanding pool of violence that saw neighbor-fighting-neighbor and over 2000 die, as well as the destruction of numerous Muslim homes and facilities (Bardi, 1). Such atrocities embodied the rising violence that coincided with appeals to Hindutva and the result of keeping a country unified only through opposing others. Further indicative of communalistic violence was the 2002 multiple city-wide anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat, among increasing others. The degree of violence and destruction within these pogroms once more led to mass disorder and 1500 dead, again mostly Muslims. The chief Guajarati Minister was so cajoled for his instigating of these horrors that he was banned from ever traveling to the US-that is, until that same man, Narendra Modi, assumed the national office of Prime Minister years later. These atrocities may have contributed to the national BJP government’s political defeat (who themselves had risen to power by politically moderating post-1992). Yet astoundingly, Modi and the Gujarati state-BJP easily won numerous re-elections (and simultaneously developed a powerful national apparatus) arguably because of the pogrom! These events embody how dangerous Hindutva is to any group of people Hinduta deems the ‘other’-both in its physical toll as well as in its increasingly unabated popularity. Recent violence against

Christians in the state of Orissa in 2008 (resulting in mass arson and 120 dead) as well as the continual expulsion of certain Muslim-tenants (who lived in the state of Assam for generations) only further speak to this. As opposed to a political burden, these brutal acts are becoming less taboo and moreso expected, or even supported! And this movement is nowhere near peaking, especially with many of its most fervent followers now residing in the capital of New Delhi.

Modern Hindutva in the Current Reign of the BJP and Going Forward

Hindu Nationalism has become the political norm throughout India’s Coalition Era and through the present BJP-majority government, which itself denotes radicalism masked by economic astuteness. Although its ideological diversity is growing, the party’s hold on power, Hindutva-oriented or not, is likely inevitable for the near future.

The make-or-break moment for Hindutva Power came in 1989 when the Congress lost its majority and India entered the so-called ‘Coalition Era.’ With the loss of its monopoly power, the INC had to realign further towards nationalism to maintain even modest support (Sathyamurthy, 3000). This proves the inevitable appeal to pan-Hinduism as a common identity, with increasing electoral support for it coming from the Indian Citizenry. Alas, if even the secular party of independence now strongly embraced this once-radical ideology, clearly India as a collective nation was moving in this direction as well.

Within this new political, social, and cultural spectrum did the BJP emerge as genuine opposition in its own right, appealing to a growing and diverse middle class. Rebounding from its radicalism in 1992, the party won a resounding victory in Uttar Pradesh in 1996. Notably, much of its gains at this time came from the BJP’s outreach to traditionally marginalized castes, with Sathyamurthy writing: “… it would be unwise to exaggerate the extent to which the lower middle castes have gained political power in the northern Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar…” (Sathyamurthy, 3003). The promise of prioritizing infrastructure development, reasonable regulations, and playing a role in an increasingly global economy garnered substantial support from the middle class in Uttar Pradesh, and then increasingly in other states going forward. But again, this was a middle-class outreach that excluded traditional minorities, which the BJP still derided as the ‘other.’ The flexibility inherent to Hindutva still allowed the party to channel a narrative of the oppressed, as long as the fault of such was placed on those deemed outside the social order. The BJP continually campaigned as such so superbly that they even gained more seats than the INC by 1998 (though they still remained short of a majority). And even as its political power grew, it kept a tight relationship with the ever-controversial RSS, an attachment speaking to its continually communalistic instincts. Nonetheless, nearly a dozen years later has decades of political maneuvering finally availed the BJP, for they maintain the first non-Congress majority in a free India’s History.

The Majority BJP government’s previous and present governmental actions both affirm and deny historical accusations of sectarianism. Recall the previously mentioned crisis in Assam could see up to 4 million residents losing their citizenship, with the BJP only pledging to help Hindus in what could be their worst refugee crisis since partition. And that is not even to mention many other avenues of tyrannical majoritarian sentiment the BJP has whipped up through various acts or legislative attempts (like punishing the killing of cows, a sacred Hindu animal). Alas, the party may be doing such to permanently pit Hindus against Muslims: “The BJP has brought back the modus operandi of Partition-consolidation and exclusion-to put forth a vision of Hindu unity, all the while maintaining an electoral upper hand” (Bardi, 8). These words speak to a social and political strategy of Hindutva that after nearly 60 years, appears to finally be dominant. Hindu nationalism may be approaching synchronization with what was never separately founded: Indian Nationalism. Yet this is again an identity only symmetrical in unifying behind similar ‘enemies’ more than similar experience.

As it grows and diversifies, Hindutva embodied within the BJP is sure to continually achieve electoral victories via impressive infrastructure and an inspiring ministerial candidate. Verily, as the ideological tent of the largest political party in the world further expands, Milan Vaishnav posits so too will the philosophical diversity to which Hindu nationalism (or Indian Nationalism) is interpreted: “Like any big-tent party, it is hardly a monolith. You will find internationalists, isolationists, libertarians, and nationalists all residing under the general umbrella of the BJP” (Vaishnav, 1). Such realities prove the trouble of equivocating Indian Nationalism with Hindu Nationalism, as there is still much debate (even within the BJP) on what specifies either. Yet when it comes to the party itself, many may view it as distinctly anti-minority (and specific policies have certainly embodied this) while others may argue it as leveling the playing field for lower caste groups (via its push for various quotas). Regardless of which is truer, it is safe to say the BJP has not scared away too much support, at least for now. On a state level, it maintains remarkably stable coalition governments in the few areas where it cannot yet win a majority. It currently has a role in 17/29 states, and also boasts an excellent national party apparatus. Furthermore, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, himself a former RSS boss, is a gifted public speaker with a powerful life story of overcoming the odds; attributes making him astoundingly popular to the Indian populace. Yet even though the BJP Era is seeing record-breaking assaults on minorities and the media, Modi is like his BJP predecessor, the moderate Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in that he is able to focus on development and diplomacy while skirting radicalism and sedition laws to the back pages of the news (Swamy, 2).

The present productive messaging of the BJP will likely prolong its reign into the foreseeable future. It may seem that an ambitious reform-based agenda focused on economic sensibility and a corralling of corruption would be at odds with fearmongering, divisive quotas, and increasing violence against minorities. Indeed, many observers are paying close attention to emerging rules on foreign funding, as this could drive many helpful NGOs, otherwise assisting traditionally marginalized groups, out of the country. Yet in terms of global perspective, if current trends continue, it seems the West and other developed powers will likely remain complacent with the current pro-growth ideology, even despite increasing violence. As Hindus make up the staggering majority of the populace, the narrative of an increasingly isolated and vulnerable minority may get lost in a growing pro-Hindutva dialogue. This then means that India’s future depends on the political narrative the BJP themselves chooses to channel, and how successful such will be economically, politically, and especially electorally.

IV. Conclusion

This paper has discussed the evolving role of Hindu nationalism, via its foundations in trying to unify a diverse subcontinent, its growth alongside a maturing and identity-less India, and its seemingly dominant ideological rule present-day. Although India has historically been a country with a rich tradition of public debate and cultural respect, the maintenance of these functions may be impossible if recent Hindu nationalism is less a contemporary phase and more a crescendo of unabating themes invoked since the nation’s inception. As Swamy writes: “It would be easy to see in these developments of the breakdown of civic order. But placed in historical context, they appear to be yet another part of a century-old project to construct a homogeneous national identity for India” (Swamy, 2). Indeed, if this paper makes one theme abundantly clear, it is that this radicalism, and the necessity of constructing common identity, is anything but a new phenomenon. And as a nation with 1/7 of the world’s population continues to grapple with these concerning divisions, such may not foreshadow well for Western countries who themselves will try to carve out unifying principles amongst an increasingly divided citizenry. Hopefully the greatest lesson India has to offer for the rest of the world still remains to be seen. With that in mind, India’s future, and the fate of its fundamentalism, will be very telling.